Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Loretta Penfold Records v. Gary M. Briggs : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Gary N. Anderson; Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen; Counsel for Appellee.
George W. Preston, Joseph M. Chambers; Preston & Chambers; Counsel for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Loretta v. Briggs, No. 930776 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5682

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

w

msaJr^$bal£&

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, aka, *
LORETTA GALLENT
Plaintiff/Appellee
vs.

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
Case No. 930776-CA

GARY M. BRIGGS

Defendant/Appellant

P r i o r i t y No. 15

APPEAL FROM AN ORDER OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUDGE GORDON J. LOW

GARY N. ANDERSON
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
175 EAST 100 NORTH
LOGAN, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610
COUNSEL-PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
GEORGE W. PRESTON 2643
JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS 0612
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 FEDERAL AVENUE
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
(801) 752-3551
COUNSEL-DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

FILED
FEB

71994

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LORETTA PENFOLD RECORDS, aka, *
LORETTA GALLENT
Plaintiff/Appellee

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
Case No. 930776-CA

vs.
GARY M. BRIGGS
Defendant/Appellant

P r i o r i t y No. 15

APPEAL PROM AN ORDER OP THE PIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OP CACHE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
JUDGE GORDON J. LOW

GARY N. ANDERSON
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN
175 EAST 100 NORTH
LOGAN, UT 84321
(801) 752-2610
COUNSEL-PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
GEORGE W. PRESTON 2643
JOSEPH M. CHAMBERS 0612
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
31 FEDERAL AVENUE
LOGAN, UTAH 84321
(801) 752-3551
COUNSEL-DEFENDANT/APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATUTES CITED

1

ARGUMENT

1

POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

1

POINT II
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE DEFENDANT HAS NO
TENABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO ASSERT A BAR
TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE
POINT III
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE DISTRICT COURT'S
RULING IS SOUND AND IS BASED UPON
UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
NOT TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WAS NOT
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
CONCLUSION

7
8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Citations:

Page

Allen v. Greyhound Lines. Inc.f 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978) ..

4, 5

Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const.,
731 P. 2d 483 (Utah 1986)

6

Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corporation.
667 P.2d 34 (Utah 1983)

3

Holloway v. Butler. 662 S.W.2d 688 (Texas)

3

Holm v. B & N Service. Inc.. 661 P.2d 951 (Utah 1983)

2, 3

Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983)

7

Rainford v. Rvtting. 22 Utah 2d 252 451 P.2d 769 (Utah 1969)

7

Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop v. Utah Ice and Storage,
187 F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951)

3

STATUTES CITED
§78-12-45

1, 2, 4

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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*
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STATUTES CITED
§78-12-45 Action Barred in Another State Barred Here.
"When a cause of action has arisen in another
state or territory, or in a foreign country,
and by the laws thereof an action thereon
cannot be maintained against a person by
reason of the lapse of time, an action shall
not be maintained against him in this state,
except in favor of one who has been a citizen
of this state and who has held the cause of
action from the time it accrued."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS CLAIM IS BARRED BY THE
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS,
The Standard of Review in a case of statutory construction
and/or a question of law requires that the reviewing court give no
particular deference to the Trial Court7s interpretations.

The

same can be said for counsel/s interpretations1.
The questions to be addressed are as follows:
(1)

Is the action brought by Plaintiff a contract or tort

action and is the distinction of any relevance as it relates to the
statute of limitations issue?
1

The fact the Defendant's counsel has, on one or more occasions,
changed, modified or even reversed a position is of no importance. It is not
relevant to the decision to be made by this Court.

(2)

What specific act or fact triggered the running of the

statute of limitations?
(3)

Taking into consideration Issues 1 and 2 what is the

appropriate state statute of limitations? and
(4)

Does the exclusion found in 78-12-45 UCA apply in this

case?
Analysis Issue I
Plaintiff's Complaint sounds in a mixture of contract and
tort.

However, the prayer for relief seeks recovery of personal

property, to-wit: Stock Certificate No. 2939 for 32,190 shares of
Digitran stock.

The Plaintiff delivered to the Defendant the

certificate and an irrevocable stock power (Ex. 6) in the State of
Louisiana.
Defendant

Plaintiff

claims

this

was

a

pledge

agreement.

claims the transfer was outright and unconditional2.

Whether this is an action in contract or tort need not be decided.
The Trial Court erred in holding this case as one in contract.
In Holm v. B & N Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951 (Utah 1983) the
Utah Supreme Court stated:
Neither the form of the proceeding nor the
name applied to it can change the nature of
the wrong or injury. It is the wrongful act
which results in injury and damage which gives
the right of action, and, if the injuries are
to personal property, the statute fixes the
time within which such an action must be
brought, and the name of the action can have
no effect upon the question of what statute
controls.

2

For purposes of this portion of the brief the Defendant concedes for
argument sake only that such a pledge relationship existed nonetheless any action
seeking recovery or damages is barred by the Statute of Limitations as a matter
of law. A significant portion of the prior brief and this brief are devoted to
the Parole Evidence Rule and law surrounding the Statute of Frauds, however, the
Defendant denies any such pledge relationship and has strongly resisted such
below.

See also Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-op v, Utah Ice and Storage. 187
F.2d 652 (10th Cir. 1951).

In the Holm case the Court ruled that

the three-year statute of limitation for the recovery of personal
property was controlling regardless of whether or not the action
was tort or contract.
Analysis Issue 2
Relative to the second issue, when Digitran issued its stock
certificates to the Defendant in Texas on November 8, 1988,
Plaintiff claims, in her affidavit, she was entitled to the return
of her personal stock as of that date.

(See the record pg. 203)

The Statute of Limitations started to run as of November 8, 1988,
when Plaintiff had the right to ask for and demand the return of
her shares which she claims were held as security. The Statute of
Limitations begins to run at the moment that a cause of action
arises. Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corporation, 667 P.2d 34 (Utah
1983).

Holloway v. Butler. 662 S.W.2d 688 (Texas).

The Defendant's transfer of the stock into his own name has
nothing to do with the Plaintiff's right to reclaim her stock
certificate

and therefore the transfer of the stock

on the

corporate books is not an act which triggers the running of the
statute

of

limitations.

Plaintiff's

interpretation

of

the

commencement of the right of action clearly benefits Plaintiff's
argument but is unsupported by case law.
At the time of the delivery of the stock to Gary Briggs by
Digitran in fulfillment of Digitran's agreement found in Exhibit
No. 4, Plaintiff could have and should have, under her own theory,
sought redelivery of her stock certificate situated in Texas. The
Plaintiff's lack of diligence in seeking return of her stock does

not affect the times for the commencement of the limitation period•
Plaintiff's cause of action arose in Texas.
Analysis Issue 3
To address the third issue set forth above, on November 8,
1988, the Defendant was a resident of Texas; the stock certificate
which is the subject of this action was situated in Texas.
Under the Defendant's theory, Plaintiff's cause of action
arose when Plaintiff voluntarily parted with the stock certificate
and delivered the stock power to Defendant.

Plaintiff claims she

can use parole evidence and extrinsic evidence to prove a contract
or pledge agreement. However, even under the Plaintiff's theories
the statute of limitations for the recovery of personal property
commenced to run no later than November 8, 1988. Plaintiff's cause
of action arose in Texas where Defendant and the certificate were
located.

This action is barred under the two-year Texas statute3,

the three-year Utah statute4 or a one-year Louisiana statute5.
Analysis Issue 4
The fourth issue is whether or not the exception in 78-12-45
UCA of the Utah Statute applies to Plaintiff.

The statute states

that a Plaintiff cannot maintain an action in the State of Utah
when the cause of action has arisen in another state or territory
and is barred in that state. The statute excepts a situation where
a person has been a citizen of this state and who has held the
cause of action from the time it accrued.

The case of Allen v.

Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978) addressed the issue
3

Addendum A Appellant's Brief - Texas.

4

Addendum A Appellant's Brief - Utah.

5

Addendum A Appellant's Brief - Louisiana.

and the Court said:
"The more reasonable interpretation of the
exclusive language of the statute is that it
affords the protection of Utah Law only to its
residents who incur causes of action while
outside this state. Such an interpretation
serves the legitimate purposes of protecting a
limited class (Utah residents) as of the date
their cause of action arises although they
have since chosen a new state of residence.
Most importantly, it does no violence to the
(borrowing statute) which stands on the books
for the purpose of preserving the worthwhile
concepts of comity".
Plaintiff

brought

this

cause

of

action

into Utah

from

elsewhere. Defendant has no contacts with the State of Utah nor is
he a resident of the State of Utah. If the cause of action accrued
when Plaintiff claims she was entitled to the return of her stock
on November 8, 1988, her cause of action is clearly against the
Defendant in the State of Texas.

Plaintiff is not a citizen of

Utah who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued as
required by the exception found in the Utah Statute6.
Plaintiff delayed the commencement of this action from October
7, 1987 to the 3rd day of January, 1992, a period of approximately
five

years.

The

Plaintiff

alleges

seeks the return

neither
of

32,190

fraud

nor

misrepresentation

yet

shares of

corporate stock.

Defendant contends the statute of limitations

started to run at the time of the delivery of the stock on October
7, 1987.

Plaintiff, on the other hand, by affidavit, claims her

right of action started when Digitran issued 40,192 shares of its
stock to Gary Briggs on November 8, 1988. Either way the Plaintiff
has failed to timely bring this action whether the court applies
the Utah, Texas or Louisiana Statute of Limitations.
No Allegation of citizenship exists in the record.

POINT II
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE DEFENDANT HAS NO TENABLE BASIS ON
WHICH TO ASSERT A BAR TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE.
The Trial Court erred in granting the summary judgment by
considering evidence in violation of the parole evidence rule. As
cited in the Defendant-Appellant's Brief parole evidence is only
available to the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff demonstrates that the
agreement between the parties is ambiguous.
The Plaintiff asks this Court to literally discard the parole
evidence rule and accept the uncorroborated testimony of Plaintiff
to prove what she claims to be a pledge agreement between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant.
The Plaintiff then proffers to the court a document (Ex. 34)
authored solely by the Plaintiff which has no nexus or connection
with the Defendant.
by the Defendant.

It's authenticity is not proved nor admitted
The Plaintiff would have this Court find that

there is a conditional pledge agreement between the Plaintiff and
Defendant based upon the Plaintiff's affidavit and Ex. 34.

The

parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds bar Plaintiff's
ability to prove any other agreement between the parties other than
the unconditional delivery of stock coupled with an irrevocable
stock power for its transfer. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros.
Const., 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
POINT III
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS
SOUND AND IS BASED UPON UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE RECORD.
Summary Judgment must be based upon competent admissible
evidence not in violation of the parole evidence rule, the statute
of frauds, and not creating a contested issue of fact.

Plaintiff

cites discoverable evidence as a grounds for justifying the courts
granting of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff and
the Trial Court erred.

In Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah

1983) and Rainford v. Rvttinq. 22 Utah 2d 252 451 P.2d 769 (Utah
1969),

the

Supreme

Court

struck

an

affidavit

consisting

of

inadmissible parole evidence submitted for the purpose of varying
the terms of a written agreement.
Plaintiff relies solely on inadmissible testimony to attempt
to prove an agreement between the parties.

Lastly should this

court find that the parole evidence rule nonetheless allows the
admission of the conditions in evidence, the Trial Court ignored
the

issue

of the payment of royalties which was

a further

condition. Creation of a material issue of fact requires a trial.
The Trial Court and Plaintiff completely ignores the issue of
the payment of royalties as a further condition for the retaining
of the stock.

However, the bottom

line is that the stock

transferred by the Plaintiff to the Defendant was irrevocable and
was concluded on the date of the transfer as of October 7, 1987.
POINT IV
PLAINTIFF CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURTS RULING NOT TO JOIN
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
Should this Court determine that the unconditional stock power
is ambiguous and allows parole and extrinsic evidence to prove a
conditional delivery by the Plaintiff of the 32,190 shares of stock
to the Defendant, then it is obvious that other parties are
involved, such as the corporation whose obligation is to issue to
the Defendant stock under the terms of the agreement to prepay
Class A or Class B notes

(see Exhibit 4) •

Also the same

corporation has the obligation to pay royalties to the general

partner of the limited partnership.

This would then require the

inclusion of the general partner in the limited partnership to be
present in court for the determination of the issue as to receipt
and payment of royalties.

The inclusion of these parties is not

difficult because the Plaintiff is the President of Digitran, Inc.
and is the major shareholder of the corporation which is the
general partner of the limited partnership.

Therefore, the only

way a complete determination of the issues raised is to have before
the court all parties interested in the transaction.

The Utah

Statutes cited by the Defendant in Defendant's Brief authorize just
this sort of litigation.
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff would like this Court to believe that the
Defendant is an opportunist who having received 32,190 shares of
the Plaintiff's shares of stock of Digitran Inc. from Plaintiff,
now refuses to return the stock to Plaintiff. The Defendant claims
there are other unsolved issues such as the payment of royalties.
As a practical matter this case is easily resolved by the obvious
determination that the Plaintiff's action is barred by the Statute
of Limitations in any state including the State of Utah where
Plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property.
If this case is not resolved by the Statute of Limitations
this Court must then examine closely the contested evidence by
which Plaintiff seeks to prove a conditional delivery of stock or
a

pledge

agreement

and

then

determine

whether

or

not

the

conditional delivery and pledge agreement are proved by competent
admissible evidence or whether the Parole Evidence Rule and Statute
of

Frauds,

in

the

absence

of

any

allegation

of

fraud

or

misrepresentation precludes the use of such non-evidence.

If the

Court thereafter concludes that notwithstanding there is a pledge
or conditional delivery, the court must then determine whether or
not additional parties should be brought in relative to royalties
and send the matter back to the District Court for trial.
The Defendant urges this Court to reverse the Trial Court on
the issues of the Statute of Limitations and to dismiss Plaintiffs
action.
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